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BOOK REVIEWS

Understanding Buffalo's Economic
Development*
THOMAS E. HEADRICKt & JOHN HENRY SCHLEGELtt
POWER FAILURE: POLITICS, PATRONAGE, AND THE ECONOMIC

FUTURE OF BUFFALO, NEW YORK. By Diana Dillaway.
Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2006. Pp. 1, 266.
$24.00 (hardcover).

Case studies can often illuminate difficult topics.
Economic development, really the economic resuscitation of
aging urban cities, qualifies as a difficult topic. Expert
opinion here ranges from imprecations to keep the
infrastructure in good shape, the streets clean and safe, and
wait for businesses and jobs to come, all the way to
similarly fervent directions to rely on full bore, glossy
magazines and lavishly funded sales pitches to complete
strangers. Littered in the area are asserted axioms about
community involvement and governmental role, as well as
about the importance of housing stock, public facilities,
demography, and the right kinds of jobs.
* Thanks go to colleagues at a Buffalo faculty seminar for their assistance in
this project.
t SUNY Distinguished Service Professor and Professor of Law, University at
Buffalo Law School.
tt Professor of Law and Roger and Karen Jones Faculty Scholar, University at
Buffalo Law School.
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The limited number of available case studies about
economic development primarily describe successesBoston's Market Area, New York's Battery Park,
Baltimore's Inner Harbor, Pittsburgh's Triangle, Seattle's
Pioneer Square. The implicit message of such studies is
"follow me." Case studies of failures, unfortunately few in
number, are potentially at least as instructive, especially
because the public audience for the literature on economic
development likely consists of areas with not a lot of spare
change or special economic attractions. Diana Dillaway has
produced such a case study of failure, appropriately called
Power Failure.' Unfortunately, part of the lesson it teaches
is that a good case study needs to understand, in detail, the
underlying economic costs and benefits of allegedly failed
initiatives, to get the facts straight, and to understand the
political (in the broadest sense) forces well enough to
recognize the limits of the possible. And then there are the
difficulties that derive from an author's academic and
professional orientation-in this case, planning. However,
before we address these problems let us first carefully
summarize Ms. Dillaway's story.
The story starts with a brief recounting of Buffalo's
economic history. The city started as an entrep6t, a place
for trading and trans-shipment of goods, as a result of being
the place where the Erie Canal met that great inland
waterway known as the Great Lakes. First, goods moved
between lake freighters and canal boats; later, between lake
freighters and railroad cars. After electric power from
Niagara Falls reached Buffalo, the city quickly diversified
its economy into milling the Midwestern grain that moved
through Buffalo and expanded its existing iron works and
related manufacturing facilities into steel mills and their
related manufacturing facilities. Such expansion meant
that by the early part of the Twentieth Century, the city
was the second largest railhead after Chicago and the
second largest grain port after Minneapolis.
Two world wars hid the fact that Buffalo's economy
was, nevertheless, only superficially healthy. In 1900 the
city was the eighth largest in the United States; by 1910 it
1. DIANA DILLAWAY, POWER FAILURE: POLITICS,
ECONOMIC FUTURE OF BUFFALO, NEW YORK (2006).
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was tenth; by 1920, eleventh; and by 1930, thirteenth. The
city was growing, but Detroit, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh,
Milwaukee, and San Francisco were growing faster. Ms.
Dillaway identifies five factors that caused this decline: (1)
shifts in transportation patterns; (2) the failure of steel
companies to invest in the newest technology in the face of
global over capacity after World War II; (3) the
disappearance of locally owned and operated businesses; (4)
a militant, effective union movement; and (5) a highly
fractured leadership, both public (as a result of a
fragmented governmental structure) and private.
Next, Ms. Dillaway expands upon this last factor in
Buffalo's decline: the state of Buffalo's leadership in the
Fifties. First, she focuses on three differing groups of
individuals who held power: the traditional WASP elite, an
alliance headed by two bankers and the Buffalo Evening
News' publisher, tied together in a social and Protestant
religious network; the Irish, Italian, and Polish ethnic
communities that were held together by the Catholic
Church and the Democratic Party's ethnic spoils system;
and an economic grouping dominated by bankers and
lawyers that only sometimes enlisted the talents of
manufacturers. The first two were deeply wed to the status
quo, but not, therefore, to each other, as can be shown by
the editorial competition between the Buffalo News and the
Buffalo Courier-Express, a more working class, ethnic
neighborhood-focused paper. Similarly, the bankers were
not monolithic, as indicated by the hostile competition
between the two largest banks. Nor was even the business
community unified, as shown by a rivalry between the city's
Chamber of Commerce and the much smaller Greater
Buffalo Development Foundation, which seems to have
been formed because of dissatisfaction with the inability of
the larger, and so more unwieldy, Chamber to address
development issues. Buffalo's was not a monolithic elite.
With the economic and social structure of the city
established, Ms. Dillaway starts her presentation of
Buffalo's visible decline in the Sixties. Here she notes the
efforts at slum clearance, especially along the waterfront
southwest of downtown and in an African-American
neighborhood east of downtown and several successful
building projects in downtown-a new mall and four bank
buildings-and one failed project-a convention center sited
to help revitalize an old hotel that, perhaps duplicitously,
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was turned into office space. She also details the growth of
African-American political power exemplified by the
creation of a self-help organization called BUILD. However,
most of the discussion is focused on what Ms. Dillaway
asserts are three projects that might have "slowed or
football stadium
reversed the city's economic decline," 2-a
located near downtown, a University campus located on the
downtown waterfront, and a rapid transit system designed
to link downtown and the suburbs. The first two were built
in suburban locations and are seen as examples of issues
where the various city elites could not agree on what to do,
in part because some feared change to their cozy
domination of Buffalo's social and economic spheres. The
third took forever to complete and never actually linked the
city to even one suburb; it well deserves the label of a
"shaggy dog story."
Ms. Dillaway's discussion of the Seventies is aptly
called "Crisis," for it is during these years that the area's
heavy manufacturing economy largely crumbled and
Buffalo came close to declaring bankruptcy. In 1971,
Bethlehem Steel cut its workforce in half; by the early
Eighties its plant was all but closed and Republic Steel's
facilities were completely closed. Six of the city's thirteen
railroads declared bankruptcy. Houdaille Industries,
National Gypsum, Carborundum, and Western Electric
moved their plants elsewhere. All tolled, about ninety
factories were closed and thirty thousand manufacturing
jobs, lost. Thus, manufacturing employment declined by
16.3% while finance, insurance, and real estate employment
grew by 28.8% as banking and other services became a
more prominent part of the economy. Overall, employment
in the region grew by a paltry 1.3%.
Closed plants and bankrupt railroads do not pay taxes,
and so, by the middle of the decade, Buffalo was on the
brink of bankruptcy, saved only by creative finance followed
by significant infusions of state and federal funds. Not
much economic development took place during these years,
although an apparently good plan for such was put forth by
the Greater Buffalo Development Foundation only to be
ignored amidst predictable business infighting. The
convention center was opened, but it lacked the hotel rooms

2. Id. at 97.
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necessary to support it. The project to build a rapid transit
network diddled along. Attempts to build business
leadership quickly collapsed as the two existing business
organizations continued feuding. This feud was stoked by
their fight over control of the newly formed the Erie County
Industrial Development Agency, an entity that was
designed to lure industry into the region with low-cost
financing and tax breaks, but was so feeble that it could
neither entice nor force the Town of Amherst to join it. With
business in disarray, organized labor, having suffered
massive job losses, was in no mood to cooperate and refused
to do so. Amidst all of this chaos and destruction, the
Democratic machine was turned out of City Hall by a
renegade Democrat, elected as an Independent, who built
and maintained his own political organization, based in
Irish neighborhoods, with a patronage network separate
from that of the Democratic Party. He pointedly shunned a
growing African-American community that, like the city
itself, saw its organizations fail as the economy lowered all
boats.
Ms. Dillaway begins her discussion of the Eighties by
recognizing that, at this time, new leaders appeared in the
city. Foremost was the then still new mayor who served for
sixteen years and somewhat surprisingly built a good
relationship with the business community. He used nonprofit government corporations to control and spend federal
funds without the Common Council's political involvement,
infuriating the Council and especially its African-American
members. New faces also appeared in the business
community. An informal organization of bankers, lawyers,
and businessmen called the "Group of 18" that, for a
change, included the president of the University at Buffalo,
was born out of frustration with the endless fighting
between the two major business organizations and quickly
superseded both. When the business community could be
convinced to speak, it now could speak with one voice and
did so when attempting to retain jobs when area businesses
threatened to move. So too could the newspapers, as the
Buffalo Evening News, under new ownership, absorbed the
Courier-Express and then moderated its editorial policy a
bit.
With fewer people at the table, several projects were
completed: two hotels, two office buildings, and a baseball
stadium. Even organized labor participated by providing
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mortgage money for one of the hotels. And work was begun
on the development of a medical campus near downtown
combining a large hospital, a state funded cancer research
hospital, a medical research organization, and UB's Medical
School. At long last the rapid transit system was finished;
no one would say that it was completed, as a lack of funds
caused by the endless delays in settling on a plan meant
that it never reached its intended terminus at the UB
campus in Amherst.
There were, however, some dropped balls, as usual.
Plans for waterfront development, bruited about for over
twenty years, were haggled over, but only barely begun.
The only tangible markers of these efforts were the
construction of some high-end residences. And despite the
Council's best efforts, the neighborhoods, especially AfricanAmerican ones, and the Buffalo Public Schools suffered
from a lack of attention. Flight to the suburbs continued, as
did heavy dependence on state and federal subsidies, about
which Ms. Dillaway, quoting the noted urbanist Jane
Jacobs, comments, "[H]eavy and unremitting subsidies are
transactions of decline, and once adopted, the need for them
grows greater with time, and the wherewithal for supplying
'3
them grows less.
Ms. Dillaway barely discusses the Nineties which saw
the return of the Democratic Party, largely stripped of its
former organization, to power in City Hall, not that this
change altered the now traditionally hostile relations
between the Mayor and the Common Council. Still,
business groups merged into the Buffalo Niagara
Partnership and increasing hints of multi-county regional
cooperation appeared. Neither seemed to lead to anything.
New plans were announced for South Buffalo, for
downtown, and for the waterfront, but never implemented.
Indeed, the only significant development project was the
work of a major bank in supporting a single Buffalo
elementary school with amazing results. In a replay of
dozens of similar disputes over the preceding forty years, a
"rancorous debate" over an expanded Peace Bridge to
Canada "became a fight without reason, filled with the

3. Id. at 187 (quoting JANE JACOBS, CITIES AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS:
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 193-94 (1984)).
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symbolism of power and control." 4 And then the city
collapsed into effective bankruptcy for a second time, this
time aided by a state imposed control board, proving Jane
Jacobs right. "Failure" was there for all to see. Whether it
was a failure of the "Power" possessed by the banker and
lawyer elite that Ms. Dillaway asserts is the heir to the
WASP elite of the Fifties, is another matter entirely.
In her introduction, Ms. Dillaway states that she sees
her story about economic development in Buffalo as "a
study of form (the structure of power), function (the process
of planning), and outcomes (initiatives)." 5 This is an odd
list. First, unless the structure of power is coextensive with
the economy of a location, something important is missing
from the analysis-that economy. Second, "initiatives" are
not the outcomes of "planning," though one hopes that they
follow the planning. Rather, outcomes are best seen as the
actual achievements in terms of economic development,
whether the result of planning or not, for among the
questions to be asked in any story of economic development
is the degree to which planning influenced actual outcomes.
It is always possible that a planning exercise could
misunderstand the economic conditions in a location, as
well as the structure of power there, and so that plans,
however sensible on their own terms, however inclusive of
all parties' interests, however formally exemplary as an
instantiation of the tenets of modern planning theory, could
yield nothing. So, let us next look at questions about the
accuracy of Ms. Dillaway's assessments of economy and of
power. After all, since the book's thesis is built around a
claimed "Power Failure," a reader's initial question ought to
be, 'Whose power failed, how, and why?" The answer may
vary in the three decades she focuses on.
Ms. Dillaway claims that in the Sixties, the traditional
WASP elite either failed to support or actively blocked
major projects critical to Buffalo's future. The projects were
a football stadium for downtown, a university campus on
the downtown waterfront, and a rapid transit system to
link downtown and the suburbs. And she argues that had
these projects been completed, Buffalo's future would have
been brighter, that it could have escaped its crisis in the
4. Id. at 204.
5. Id. at 20.
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Seventies. Is this likely to be true? When one looks at each
of these projects, it is hard to conclude that they were as
important as Ms. Dillaway claims, or that these Sixties
elites played as significant a role in the decisions as she
claims, or that these decisions were in fact wrong on the
merits or so critical to Buffalo's future.
A downtown football stadium would have consumed
substantial real estate for its footprint and, more
importantly, for parking. Other uses probably would have
generated more city revenue. Such a stadium is used ten
times a year (two exhibitions, eight regular season games,
and possibly one or two more playoff games). For the
remaining 97% of the year, it is empty. It is hard to argue
that such a limited-use facility is a critical generator of
economic activity. It is far better to have a baseball stadium
(seventy to seventy-five games) or hockey arena (forty to
fifty games), than a football stadium. Of course, all three
properly located together would limit redundant parking
and improve the economies of scale, but the football
stadium is the least important of the trio.
Dual purpose (baseball/football) stadiums were all the
rage in the Sixties. Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Oakland, San
Francisco, Houston, Minneapolis, and Seattle come to mind.
Most of these localities have abandoned the concept and
invested heavily in new facilities since then. Even in
retrospect, Buffalo's rejection of a downtown football
stadium does not seem inherently wrong.
The development of a SUNY/Buffalo (the pre-existing
University of Buffalo, newly merged into the State
University in 1962) campus on the downtown waterfront,6
for which Dillaway argues, was never a realistic prospect.
Her account ignores or misstates the critical facts. When
the issue of where to locate the expanded University was
under consideration, essentially in 1963 and 1964, two sites
were seriously considered: expansion of the existing campus
onto the Grover Cleveland Golf Course at Main and Bailey
and into the surrounding neighborhoods along Main Street,
or purchase of a larger site in the near suburbs. Amherst

6. The following discussion of the location of the SUNY/Buffalo campus is a
condensation of the discussion of the topic in WILLIAM R. GREINER & THOMAS E.
HEADRICK, WITH W.J. SNYDER, LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION: A SPATIAL
HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF/AT BUFFALO (forthcoming 2007).
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was the logical location because of proximity to and ease of
movement from the existing campus and because the
University already owned 246 acres in the area. Contrary to
Ms. Dillaway's account, the University came to that
ownership initially as a way to obtain Grover Cleveland
Park in the Fifties. Already needing space for expansion, it
offered the City $500,000 for the park. The City set the
price at $1 million. The University then bought the private
Audubon Course in Amherst for about $500,000, hoping to
swap it for Grover Cleveland. However, before the swap
could be negotiated, the Town of Amherst, flush with state
subsidies, took the Audubon Course for public recreation
purposes. The hope of getting the City to make Grover
Cleveland available by swapping land having disappeared,
UB used the proceeds from Amherst's action to purchase
land adjacent to the Audubon Course.
When the State, with its eminent domain powers,
entered the picture in 1962, Grover Cleveland came back
into the University's thinking. Most of the UB campus
leadership and faculty groups favored expanding the UB
campus at Main and Bailey and holding the Amherst land
for peripheral campus activities, such as research facilities,
married student housing, and athletics. But the State
University administration feared that an expanded UB
campus at that location would not accommodate the longterm growth of the University and would create tensions
with the City and local residents over Grover Cleveland and
expansion into the surrounding neighborhoods. Thus, the
SUNY Trustees chose the Amherst site in 1964, while
keeping the existing campus for the Medical and other
Health Science Schools.
All State University and UB records leading up to the
decision to locate the campus in Amherst are devoid of any
mention of the Waterfront site, except one-the Moore
Report commissioned by the State University Construction
Fund-a state entity separate from the State University
and often at loggerheads with it over SUNY campus siting
and construction issues. Moore had no substantial contact
either with UB or SUNY officials in preparing his report.
Not surprisingly, State University officials gave the Moore
Report little attention because it came late in the process
(February of 1964), came from a suspect source (the
Construction Fund), and was rather superficial in its
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approach, totally ignoring how the University might
function in any of the six locations it surveyed.
Then, how did the possibility of a Waterfront University
ever rise to the level of public consciousness that Ms.
Dillaway describes? Pretty much the way she recounts. Two
years later, a group of Buffalo citizens found out about
Moore's listing of the Waterfront among the possible sites,
stimulated some newspaper coverage, part of the endless
competition between the city's newspapers, and thus
created public pressure on the Governor during an election
year. The pressure resulted in a study to be completed after
the election by a process tilted toward the much larger
Amherst site, which by that time had been substantially
acquired by SUNY. The result was obvious.
The history of UB's development shows that the
Waterfront site was never a possibility. Moreover, a careful
examination of the site would reveal that it was too small,
faced serious delays involving federal Urban Renewal and
Corps of Engineers approvals, and entailed the substantial
dislocation that would accompany the relocation of perhaps
16,000 residents. And even then, its size would have
constrained further development, and so would have been a
disaster for the growth of the University as a leading
institution for the state and nation. It is also clear that the
decision rested with the State University officials in Albany
who were not inclined to listen to Buffalo people, whether
they were UB leaders and faculty, social-economic elites, or
Johnny-come-lately Buffalo politicians, if their advice
contravened the long-term SUNY plans for UB.
In Ms. Dillaway's view, the Waterfront University
would have revitalized downtown commerce, increased
demand for entertainment, hotels, and health services, and
diversified
the
city's economic
base
away from
manufacturing. The WASP elite, she argues, feared the
intrusion of progressive faculty and radical students into
the mix of Buffalo politics. All of this is doubtful. First of
all, the largest Waterfront site was 423 acres, roughly onethird the size of UB's current campuses. It would have
provided little or no space for dormitories. Most students
would have commuted from their homes or apartments
spread throughout the region. Their demand for retail and
other services downtown would have been minimal. Faculty
and staff, moreover, would have been most likely to locate
where their children would get a good education. The
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Buffalo Public Schools would have been low on that list, and
its private schools beyond most faculty member's means. As
for political impact, Amherst politics have scarcely been
radicalized by the 4,000+ faculty and staff and over 25,000
students who work and study there. Thus, on the facts and
projected beneficial impact of a Waterfront University, Ms.
Dillaway is just plain wrong.
The third project hampered or blocked by the WASP
elite was the rapid transit link or links to the suburbs.
According to Ms. Dillaway, such a system would have
brought suburbanites who had fled the city back downtown
and revived its economy with an enclosed mega-shopping
mall, costing $26 million in public funds. That was unlikely
for two reasons beyond the cost. First, Buffalo is an easy car
travel town. From many suburban locations, downtown is
at most a thirty-minute drive. Rapid transit would not cut
the time or ease of traveling to downtown. It would help
those without cars, but they then lived in Buffalo, not the
suburbs, and still do. For them, a good bus system is more
important than a single channel rapid transit line. Second,
such retail businesses as might be expected to grow
followed people to suburban housing (the City of Buffalo
was completely built out by the Fifties) where there was
ample land for diversified shopping malls, strip commercial,
and free parking. No downtown retail development, even
one served by a network of rapid transit lines, could have
competed with the convenience of suburban retail.
Perhaps the WASP elite had enough influence to block
these three developments in the Sixties. But the plain truth
is that even if they had not, it would not have made the
Buffalo that Ms. Dillaway claims. So much for
difference for
those years. 7
7. Objections to the tone of this section (and the following ones) for undue
pessimism and unwarranted optimism have been offered by two friends, Sara
Faherty and Fred Konefsky, respectively. We doubt that we are unduly
pessimistic; the City elite's record with respect to the political economy of
development has been, and continues to be, terrible. It cannot even identify
economic development opportunities accurately, as evidenced by the fact that
all three of the projects from the Sixties that are still bruited about today were
of a mostly symbolic, rather than of any economic, value. Less elite groups have
not done much better at separating symbolic from economic value. Symbols
count, but inexpensive, quickly realized symbols probably count most.
As for unwarranted optimism, we tend to believe that some things other
than the ones identified in the City elite's collective memory might have been
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Power shifted in the Seventies because the issues
shifted. The issues became how to reverse or slow the
decline in manufacturing, how to best use government
funds, and how to develop and attract new businesses. As
part of the change, labor unions, politicians, and bankers
acquired power. According to Ms. Dillaway, they used it
poorly. Little was accomplished. Her explanation is that
they had access to good studies, sensible ideas, and
adequate plans, but they failed to act in a concerted
fashion. But should that have been expected? We think not,
because for each of the main players, doing so would have
required a major transformation.
Business organizations would have had to agree to
shelve their turf wars. Labor unions would have had to
cooperate with management and give back some hard-won
benefits from the past. The City's Democratic Party, built
on ethnic neighborhood patronage, would have had to give
more prominence to the African-Americans and their
leadership than the Italians, Poles, and Irish would have
been willing to cede. White ethnics were moving to the
suburbs, but those that stayed were not inclined to share a
smaller pie with the proportionately growing AfricanAmerican population. Such accommodations take more
than a decade. As a result, an African-American leader
could, and did, win the Democratic nomination for mayor,
but the white ethnic Democrats rallied behind a white Irish
Democrat/Independent who ran against his party and won,
and won again and again and again.

done, not so much to moderate the destruction of the area's economy, but to
accelerate a bit any potential recovery. For example, if reconceived, at least one
of the Sixties projects-the subway-might have been of modest economic
value. Indeed, reconceived it still would be. Ignoring the fact that federal
monies were available only for subways, a wise person in the early Sixties
might have recognized that eventually the suburbs were going to dwarf the City
economically. Though that recognition would have been a blow to the City elite's
ego then (and probably now), that wise person might have used the large pot of
money that went into the subway to reorganize the area's transit system to link
city residents to suburban office/light industrial parks and to develop
circumferential routes that linked such suburban locations to each other.
Designed to meet peak-early morning and late afternoon-ridership
generously, such reorganization might have had modestly positive
environmental impact as well. If the willingness to offer this idea suggests
unwarranted optimism, then we are guilty here too.
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The bankers were surely willing to support efforts by
the state and county to attract new businesses, but the
funds for such an endeavor had to be managed by a
government agency, which basically had to start from
scratch in a difficult environment. New businesses needed
or wanted lower taxes, but the declining tax base
encouraged raising rates to shore up declining revenues.
New businesses needed labor with more skills than were
had by the workers displaced by declining manufacturing,
as well as lower interest rates, which the banks facing
growing inflation could not provide. In these years the deck
was pretty well stacked against these efforts at trying to
rebuild the local economy.
Maybe some foresighted politicians, bankers, and other
business and labor leaders could have come together and
allocated the declining local and heavily-monitored outside
resources to the long-term advantage of the Buffalo region.
But how would such leadership emerge from the past
framework of labor-management relations and from
political organizations, both built on quid pro quo
exchanges? How could local priorities be implemented with
the strings attached to the state and federal handouts? Ms.
Dillaway does not explain how these things might have
taken place. Planning alone is not likely to have made it
happen. So much for the Seventies.
Ms. Dillaway characterizes the Eighties as "new
leaders, old structure."8 It's a fair assessment. The old
WASP elite was replaced by a new group of bankers,
lawyers, and UB's President-many coming to Buffalo from
elsewhere. They came together as the "Group of 18." They
were supported by the new ownership of the Buffalo
Evening News-an absentee with imported, resident
management. The newspaper's ownership had chased its
competitor into closing down and, thus, became the single
voice on public issues. The Mayor had solidified his power
and excluded dissonant voices from decision-making. But as
Ms. Dillaway makes clear, both of those loci of power were
too indecisive to be able to move forward on a broad agenda.
Next, Ms. Dillaway bemoans the over-representation of
lawyers and bankers and the relative absence of
manufacturers and other business owners among these new
8. DILLAWAY, supranote 1, at 158.
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leaders. But bankers and lawyers have the greatest interest
in attracting new businesses and, thus, new clients.
Manufacturers and other businesses had their hands full in
a tough economy and certainly did not want to attract more
local competition. On the issue of broader representation,
which Ms. Dillaway urges, she is right in noting that
Ethnic/Catholic leaders and African-American leaders were
not included in this self-selected group. Both, however,
retained some power to block or frustrate any new
initiatives.
So, again, the question remains: What were the
alternatives that might have led to better results? How
would a more inclusive power structure emerge in the
setting constructed by the past? Consider the Buffalo
waterfront. Because it was once the Niagara Frontier Port
Authority, created in the Fifties to revitalize the Port of
Buffalo, the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority
controlled much of the waterfront. Since it had to bankroll
public transit in the Buffalo area, including the subway, a
colossal money loser despite its significant ridership, it was
unwilling to yield control of any of that land, the
development of which it, rightly or not, saw as providing
income to support the transit system. The City had little to
offer for the project, except a forum where neighborhood
racial and ethnic politics could be played out while
shadowboxing over other issues, that and zoning approval.
Possible funding sources have their own, not necessarily
compatible, agendas. Potential developers just want to
make money and, to the extent that they are going to rely
on private lenders, will be held to rather stiff tests of
marketability. With cross currents such as these, it is
hardly a surprise that the project did not move forward
despite endless planning followed by photo-ops and glossy
brochures.
Why might a case study such as this one
misunderstand and misestimate the forces on the ground,
as it were? After all, Ms. Dillaway's work in interviewing
participants or even onlookers to the events that she
chronicles is exemplary and her archival research
significant. In no sense has this book been tossed off. To us
it seems that one reason is disciplinary. Ms. Dillaway is a
planner. She speaks as if a properly researched, welldocumented plan will convince any and all parties in the
game, and so almost execute itself. All right-thinking people
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will agree. But such plans usually ignore entrenched
interests, personalities and egos, and past conflicts with
their attendant scores to be settled, that together really
shape what happens. A good plan starts from that reality
base and tries to construct a path to a new power structure,
new goals, and new methods of implementation by creating
new perceptions of self-interest and by logrolling and
trading. But a good plan also needs new money, and
although Ms. Dillaway lists the new money coming into
Buffalo, she does not take account of the money that
disappeared. It is altogether likely that the bottom line was
a loss, that the pie grew smaller, given the slow growth, the
out-migration from the region, the ravages of inflation, and
unemployment over the period from 1965 to 1990.
Equally distinctive is the presence of an odd confusion
that some species of planners make. Power Failureis a book
about an economy in decline and so about economic
development. Yet, only two narrowly conceived economic
development
projects are mentioned-the
Thruway
Industrial Park on abandoned railroad property and the
Buffalo-Niagara Medical Campus. Instead, the book
highlights endless disputes over public facilities envisioned
as bringing collateral economic benefits: the football
stadium, the UB campus, the light-rail, the waterfront, the
Peace Bridge. This conflation of public works with economic
development, an understandably necessary bastardization
of cost/benefit analysis in a capitalist country, is common
among planners. The roads, water and sewer lines, and
street lighting, as well as the educational resourcesschools and labor skills-that support private investment in
the retention or expansion of economic activity are slighted,
as if the lack of plausible photo-ops for the players in the
game means that such things are unimportant to economic
(or even neighborhood) development. Instead, public
facilities are highlighted. This is a planner's blindness.
And then there is the matter of inclusion. As part of
their notion of the self-executing plan, one that because of
its quality all will buy into, planners today emphasize
inclusiveness. So, near the end of her book, Ms. Dillaway
observes, "In order for economic development to work,
Buffalo's political
and
economic
leadership
must
incorporate minority leaders into the heart of the regional
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planning process." 9 And again, "This, then, is Buffalo's
challenge: to identify and implement a common ground of
leadership that serves Buffalo and the region well." 10 Such
was not always the case. Arguably the most effective
planner and implementer in New York State history was
the still much reviled Robert Moses, who consulted no one,
never built without his own monetary base, and reported
only occasionally to the Governor. To separate planning
from execution is a planner's mistake, as can be seen from
Ms. Dillaway's recurrent pleas to increase the number of
people at the table.1 1 Yet, this book recounts a truly
fractionated set of power relations in which a very large
number of people had vetoes, explicit or by virtue of simple
non-cooperation, over development projects. Increasing the
number of participants with veto power is a recipe for a
thin, pork-filled stew, small projects that threaten no one,
modestly improve neighborhood amenities, and do little or
nothing for the economy as a whole. It is just possible that
Buffalo's power failure is that it has had too much of this
kind of planning.
However, merely to speak of "Buffalo" in this singular,
isolated sense is to identify a still larger problem with this
book than the professional identity of its author. Ms.
Dillaway fails to recognize, much less to answer the
question, "What is Buffalo?" This is a common failure
among Buffaloons, and Ms. Dillaway, a member of one of
Buffalo's most prominent families, is properly seen as a
native. At times, her Buffalo is a city hemmed in by
uncooperative suburbs. At other times, it is an economic
region, stretching across two counties and possibly into
Canada. Ms. Dillaway seems caught up for the most part in
Buffalo as the city. But as an economy, it is the region that
matters. Bethlehem Steel left Lackawanna, not Buffalo.
GM is in Tonawanda, and its troubled offshoot, Delphi, in
Lockport. Ford is in Blasdell. Ms. Dillaway gives scant
attention to the role, accomplishments, and failures of Erie
County government in advancing the region's economy and
no attention to the towns and their economic development
efforts. She bemoans the stadium in Orchard Park and the

9. Id. at 215.
10. Id. at 217-18.
11. See id. at 85-88, 97-99, 108-10, 140-42.
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University in Amherst, but both have prospered. Despite all
the movement of NFL franchises, the Bills are still in
Buffalo. The University has far exceeded the size and the
strength and reputation it might have achieved had it been
located on the Waterfront. This is Ms. Dillaway's greatest
failing. She by-passed or ignored her real subject, the real
Buffalo, not the one whose boundaries were drawn over a
century and a half ago. It's not that the real Buffalo hasn't
had or doesn't now have problems, but a more complete
picture would have been more accurate and less contrived.
It might have provided a better basis for understanding the
region's past and so for moving on.

Mind Over Morality
STEVEN K. ERICKSONt
MINDS ON TRIAL. By Charles Patrick Ewing & Joseph T.

McCann. Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. x, 292. $35.00
(hardcover).
INTRODUCTION

Law is often an abstraction. As any astute lawyer
knows, much time can be spent reading statutes and
regulations, familiarizing oneself with the voluminous
procedures that dictate how law is practiced. Many law
students and attorneys alike succumb to boredom during
the prolix of law review articles permeating much legal
scholarship these days. This is unfortunate, since law has
the propensity to engage the mind and tells us much about
how and why our world operates as it does. But law, unlike
science, operates as it does not because of some selfsustaining force outside of human dictates, but solely
because of them. To put it a different way, law is the study
of human rules whereas science depends upon material
independent of human agency. Thus, to study law is really
to study how social institutions decide and effectuate
normative rules with an aim towards some social utopia. An
ordered society is, indeed, the implicit goal of law whereas
order is antithetical to the linear progression of the natural
world. 1 In this vein, law and science do not just diverge;
they are on entirely different paths from the beginning.

t MIRECC Fellow, Yale University. LL.M., Harvard Law School; Ph.D., SUNY
Buffalo; J.D., SUNY Buffalo; B.A., Canisius College. Special thanks to Michael
Perlin, Chuck Ewing, Kent Scheidegger, Glenn Reynolds, Helen Smith, Bob
Levy, Tony Marecki, Pat Erickson, and Michelle Erickson for comments and
discussions.
1. See, e.g., Rudolf Clausius, On Several Convenient Forms of the
Fundamental Equations of the Mechanical Theory of Heat, in MECHANICAL
THEORY OF HEAT 354, 365 (T. Archer Hirst ed., n.d.) ("The entropy of the
universe tends to a maximum.").
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Perhaps it is these different paths that explain why
legal questions regarding the mind are so contested while
so interesting. Studying law can inform us somewhat about
why people behave as they do. The work in law and
economics has demonstrated that people are motivated by
incentives 2 (and laws can be powerful incentives). Others
have shown how people judge risks irrationally 3 and policy
formulated by public perception of these risks is unwise at
best and downright foolish at worst. 4 These contributions
are noteworthy and have greatly expanded our
understanding of the nexus between law, policy, and the
human element. But such studies often leave us hungry for
more. While the law may be objective, its relation to each
person is subjective. It is here, the meeting of the law and
the mind, where the rubber meets the road.
And what road are we on? It is a dark one within the
deep crevasses of the mind. Whereas the law is clear (do not
kill others, for example) it tells us nothing about why people
do so anyway. Exploring the mind of the lawbreaker tells us
about the motive, the drive, the circumstances behind the
singular point in time when law X is broken with
repercussions surely to follow. In this sense, understanding
the mind of the lawbreaker tells us more of the story about
the law in addition to the psychological make-up of the
offender. Conventional notions about law follow a
predictable path: laws are enacted, they remain quietly on
the books until something bad happens, and then the
whirlwind of legal action overwhelms all involved. Yet
exploring the mind of the lawbreaker helps us understand
how the law fails to deter illegal conduct, and in this
regard, is impotent as a social control mechanism. Such
failures seem increasingly to lead lawmakers to focus more

2. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).

THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND

3. See, e.g., Jeffery J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging
in Hindsight, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 95 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,

2000).
4. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by
the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001).
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on the punishment for lawbreakers
rather than on crafting
5
effective laws themselves.
Of course, whether lawmakers should even be
concerned with compliance is perhaps irrelevant when we
are talking about malum in se crimes; even if lots of people
kill that should not mean that homicide statutes are wrong.
Yet lawmaking seems increasingly concerned with activities
outside of obviously morally reprehensible crimes. The
canon of mala prohibita is hefty and growing each day. 6
With these crimes, the moral authority of law requiring
compliance simply out of a sort of ipse dixit seems less
convincing. Since law is inherently normative, and hence a
moral authority, the legal system loses legitimacy when
that authority is out of step with moral conscience of
popular wisdom. It, thus makes sense to understand the
psychology and sociology of legal systems to gain an
appreciation of how people interact and react with the
seemingly passionless legal code.
There are many books on the topic of law and
psychology: some provide overviews of the field, 7 others
discuss important research findings, 8 but few provide an
effective, upfront experience of the personas behind the
headlines. In short, Minds on Trial9 is a good and
important book and falls in the last category. It deserves
much praise for venturing into the opaque world of the
disturbed mind. Popular wisdom often holds motives as
overly simplistic. The common explanation for the crimes of
folks like Andrea Yates or Jeffery Dahmer is that she was
crazy and he was evil. Such accountings may contain a
grain of truth, but are uninformative and ultimately
5. For a good discussion on the emphasis on punishment, see JAMES Q.
WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).

6. See Markus D. Dubber, The HistoricalAnalysis of Criminal Codes, 18 L.
& HiST. REV. 433, 434-35 (2000).
7. See, e.g., 11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY (Alan M.

Goldstein ed., 2003).
8. For a good overview of jury and eyewitness findings, see PSYCHOLOGY AND
LAW: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds.,
2005). For a great review of research on psychopathy, see HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOPATHY (Christopher J. Patrick ed., 2006).
9. CHARLES PATRICK EWING & JOSEPH T. MCCANN, MINDS ON TRIAL: GREAT
CASES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY (2006).
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unsatisfying. To appreciate the minds of people like Yates
or Dahmer means craving deep answers to questions of
motive beyond greed or the other usual suspects. While trial
lawyers seek understandings of motive to prosecute or
defend gradations of civil or criminal codes, forensic
psychologists want to understand the complex human
conditions behind the madness of Yates and the wickedness
of Dahmer. Ewing and McCann present twenty seminal
cases covering a large breadth of criminal and civil cases,
providing a good primer of the psychological investigation of
troubled minds.
The balance of this essay is organized as follows. Part I
summarizes the book and discusses its major themes. It
reviews the cases presented in Minds on Trial and
examines the interface of law and science in our culture. It
discusses how the influence of the behavioral sciences in
our modern culture begets the expert and the controversy
that inevitably flows from having such experts. The power
that psychological science has exerted through expert
testimony is examined by reference to the vast panoply of
issues upon which experts feel qualified to opine. The effect
on our social and legal systems is explored in light of
cultural dependence on science to answer difficult questions
of the human condition. The enduring skepticism of expert
testimony is reviewed with an eye on the fundamental
differences between law and science as the basis for our
dissatisfaction with experts. Part II briefly discusses the
conflict between law and science by examining the recent
Supreme Court case of Clark v. Arizona.10 Part III discusses
the implications of Clark, psychology, and science as a
moral authority.
I. TRIALS OF THE MIND
Forensic psychology is popular these days. From
students who desire to become federal agents to the
numerous television programs that populate the airwaves,
forensics is alive and well. Of course, the reality of forensic
psychology is hardly as glamorous as many would like to
believe. The training is long and arduous, the pay irregular,
and recognition, if any, fleeting. So why on earth would

10. 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006).
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anyone commit a life's work to such a pursuit? Minds on
Trial provides an answer in its approach to the broad field
that has become forensic psychology by focusing on
individual cases and its fascinating detailing of the facts
behind the headlines. What is special about Minds on Trial
is its ability to tell the stories about the people behind the
cases in an upfront and personal manner. There are many
articles and books which explain legal doctrine or present
the usual run down of facts from high-profile cases. The
idea that cases undeniably involve humans-whether they
are prosecutors, victims, or the perpetrator-is often lost in
conventional scholarship. Likewise, popular Hollywood
depictions are predictable by presenting crazed villains as
one-dimensional monsters. But reality is, like so many
things in life, far more complex. The people of focus in
Minds on Trial are just like everyone else. They put their
proverbial pants on one leg at a time, struggle with life's
challenges, and, unfortunately, make some very bad
choices. As co-author Ewing is fond of saying, he has never
met a forensic patient he didn't like. This is so, I think,
because as a psychologist, one inevitably gets the life-story
behind the accused criminal, the angry family court
litigant, and the troubled delinquent. Such stories are
invariably complicated and often sad. Many people have
endured horrendous hardships and it becomes evident
doing this line of work that most people are well
intentioned at the least, but are overcome by their choices,
circumstances, and poor judgment. But as the saying goes,
good intentions are not enough in this life.
A. Cases and Conjecture
The cases presented in Minds on Trial speak volumes
about how our legal system has a love/hate relationship
with behavioral science experts. An easy way to
conceptualize this relationship is that the legal system, like
all of us, seeks answers from psychologists when people
engage in bizarre or heinous behavior. Yet, since ultimately
such explanations will be predicated, in large measure, by
examining a person's history, such explanations rarely
suggest simple condemnation. Life histories are complicated
and remind us how we are more fortunate than the people
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we condemn.' 1 Explanations often will include descriptions
of child abuse or neglect, drug abuse, and other life
12
tragedies which appear to many as "excusing away"'
culpability. And, of course, in many respects, these expert
opinions do exactly that since our legal system operates
largely on a culpability paradigm. Many of the cases in
Minds on Trial are well-known; others were well-known
during their time. This status derives not just from the
notorious crimes or celebrity figures of the cases
themselves, but because experts were at the forefront of the
cases.
Minds on Trial begins with what is considered the first
instance of criminal profiling in modern psychology. The
case of George Metesky13 appears straightforward today: a
disturbed man terrorized an American city with home-made
bombs and was apprehended with the aid of a criminal
profile. It is perhaps fitting that Metesky is the first case
presented given the public's fascination with criminal
profiling. Ewing and McCann demonstrate how this
technique is more about applying known psychological facts
to the case at hand than relying on gut assumptions as
popular media portrayals often depict. With careful
inferences, psychologists can help construct a profile
because they understand better than most others the tragic
reality of madness. Such constructions, however, are like all
things in science insofar as they are based upon
probabilities and not certainties. Metesky was an unusual
and troubled man and his crimes bore witness to this fact.
Likewise, Lee Harvey Oswald, 14 the next case presented
in Minds on Trial, was also troubled-and that troubled
mind had been forming for quite some time with feelings of
anger and inferiority. Ewing and McCann paint a picture of
a man disturbed from his early childhood. In reading about

11. As St. Augustine elegantly put it, "love the sinner, hate the sin." ST.
AURELIUS AUGUSTINE, 2 CITY OF GOD 32 (R.V.G. Tasker ed., John Healey trans.,
J. M. Dent & Sons 1962) (1945).

12. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE: AND OTHER COPOUTS, SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994); JAMES Q. WILSON,
MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM?
(1997).
13. EWING & MCCANN, supra note 9, at 7.
14. Id. at 19.
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Oswald's aggressive antisocial personality, one cannot help
but wonder whether things would have been different had
his father been present in his life. We have grown
accustomed these days to a deluge of stories about
''antisocial" men who neglect their children and degrade
women. Yet we hear much less about the disappearance of
the father-figure from family life and the thirst many young
men have for good role models. 15 The legacy of social change
of the 1960s brought many good changes and many bad
and
ones as well. The continued decline of marriage
16
actively-involved fathers is surely one of them.
The Patty Hearst 17 case presented in Minds on Trial
also takes the reader back to the era of social change of the
1960s and 1970s. Hearst, who was kidnapped and became
an active participant in several serious crimes, was
prosecuted for those crimes upon her capture. The Hearst
case is a perplexing one because it is counterintuitive to
most who hear about it. A woman identifies with her
captors, participates in their crime spree, and then claims a
psychological defense. As Ewing and McCann demonstrate,
however, the take-home message of the Hearst case is the
calculated tactic by the defense to pursue a duress claim
instead of an insanity one presumably in the hopes that the
jury would better receive it. Such tactics were undermined,
nonetheless, by an expert whose own published works
directly contradicted his testimony and, in all likelihood, a
jury with deep suspicions of someone who crossed from
passive victim to active participant. In this case, experts
seem to deserve their reputation as "hired guns."
Other cases covered in Minds on Trial, conversely,
demonstrate how common intuitions about the mind can be

15. One way of measuring this decrease is by examining the percentage of
premarital births. The largest upswing of such births occurred between 1979
and 1984. See AMARA BACHU, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TRENDS IN MARITAL STATUS
OF U.S. WOMEN AT FIRST BIRTH: 1930 TO 1994 (1998), http://www.census.gov/

population/www/documentation/twps0020/twpsOO20.html;

see

also

DAVID

BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL
PROBLEM (1996).

16. For example, the divorce rate nearly doubled between 1960 and 1972.
See ARTHUR J. NORTON & LOUISA F. MILLER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, No. P23-180,
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE 1990'S (1992) (reporting divorce
rates from 1921 to 1989).
17. EWING & MCCANN, supra note 9, at 31.
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wrong and have devastating effects. Perhaps the most
promising research in law and psychology has centered on
the problems inherent in confessions1 8 and eyewitness
testimony. 19 The case of the Guildford Four, 20 who were
incarcerated for years based entirely on false confessions
relating to the tragic bombings at two pubs in Guildford,
England, is emblematic of the grave miscarriage of justice
that occurs during unbridled police interrogations.
Likewise, John Demjanjuk, 21 wrongly accused of being
"Ivan the Terrible" and inflicting death and torture to
thousands of Jews during World War II based mostly on
decades old eyewitness memories, is fervently proffered as
confirmation that conventional notions of probative
evidence are often wrong. Again, though, psychological
experts have both contributed and assailed conventional
notions of probative evidence. In the case of Gary
Ramona, 22 accused of child sex abuse by the recovered
memories of his daughter, Holly, it becomes clear how
psychology was used as a tool of harm. As bad as the
recovered memory movement was-and it was truly bad-it
was practiced by a few and, in time, psychological science,
not the law, corrected the practice by demonstrating that
children are highly suggestive during interviews and
recovered memories during psychotherapy have little
merit. 23

18. See Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon & Steven D. Penrod, Eyewitness
Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 45 (2006).

19. See Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of
Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33
(2004).
20. EWING & MCCANN, supra note 9, at 45.
21. Id. at 115.

22. Id. at 165.
23. For a good review of recovered memories, see Elizabeth F. Loftus &
Deborah Davis, Recovered Memories, 2 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 469 (2006).
While most professional mental health associations have denounced recovered
memories, see, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, POSITION STATEMENT ON
THERAPIES FOCUSED ON MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD PHYSICAL AND SEXUAL ABUSE

(2000), http://www.psych.org/psych__pract/therapymemoryofchildabuse8l300.cfm, it
is worth noting that the American Psychology-Law Society recently gave a
prestigious award to former Attorney General Janet Reno. Reno has been
criticized for her aggressive prosecution of sexual abuse cases during her tenure
as Florida's Attorney General which relied heavily upon recovered memories
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Many of the other cases in Minds on Trial such as the
Dan White case, 24 Woody Allen's bitter custody battle with
Mia Farrow, 25 and Mike Tyson's return to professional
boxing are engaging and important because the facts were
often blurred or ignored by the sensationalism surrounding
them during their time in the limelight. Ewing and McCann
do a commendable job of laying out the facts and the
difficulties each case presented for the behavioral experts
who overcame many ambiguities to arrive at their
conclusions. As mentioned at the outset of this Book
Review, the strength of Minds on Trial is its frank and open
discussion of the cases in retrospect. Hindsight, of course, is
supposedly twenty-twenty, and reviewing these cases
reminds us of the vitriolic and judgmental attitude so
pervasive at the time these cases were decided. People
rightly have strong feelings about sex and violence, but the
issues are rarely as simple as many would believe.
Precedents established without dispassionate analysis
invariably lead to bad outcomes.
Since behavioral experts seem at the center of bad
events that enter the legal system, it is of no surprise that
they are often condemned. 26 As the tragic cases of Colin
Ferguson and Ralph Tortorici 27 demonstrate, however, the
law must sleep in the bed it makes. Ferguson was clearly
crazy, 28 as was Tortorici. 29 Both were convicted despite

and other pseudo-psychology methods. See The Child Terror (PBS Frontline
Television Broadcast Oct. 27, 1998) for an overview of the controversy.
24. EWING & MCCANN, supra note 9, at 69. Dan White was convicted of the
homicides of San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey
Milk. White claimed a diminished capacity due to depression induced partly by
his consumption of junk food. The defense is infamously known as the "Twinkie
defense," though authors Ewing and McCann explain how this description is
often exaggerated.
25. Id. at 205.
26. See MARGARET A. HAGEN, WHORES OF THE COURT: THE FRAUD OF
PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY AND THE RAPE OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (1997) for a typical

diatribe.
27. EWING & MCCANN, supra note 9, at 177, 191.

28. Ewing and McCann make the case that Ferguson (who represented
himself pro se) was likely competent to stand trial as the court so ruled. I
disagree, and, like many critics, think he was clearly incompetent. While
arguably Ferguson employed some lawyerly tactics and presented a coherent
closing argument, the totality of facts strongly suggest that he did not have a
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serious questions about their competency during trial and
abundant evidence that each suffered from schizophrenia.
Cases like Ferguson directly flow from the fallout of cases
like Faretta v. California.30 In Faretta,the Supreme Court
held there was a constitutional right to defend oneself. As
Justice Blackmun warned in his dissent, however, the
Court was creating a constitutional right to be a fool.
Consequently, when a marginally competent defendant
makes a Faretta motion, the trial court is placed in an
impossible position. If the judge denies the motion and a
reviewing court finds the defendant competent, the error is
reversible per se; granting the motion risks allowing the
trial to become a farce. Since judges hate reversal, Ferguson
is the outcome. Tortorici31 is more ominous. Briefly put, the
court of appeals held no abuse of discretion occurred when
the trial court held Tortorici was competent, despite a
report from the prosecutor's psychiatric expert stating
otherwise. This stands in stark contrast to the Supreme
Court's holding in Drope v. Missouri32 that a "bona fide"
doubt of competency ignored by the court violates due
process. Thus, Tortorici suggests that constitutional rights
are not as entrenched as we would like to think.
While the law may be less firm than popular wisdom
suggests, the notion of evil is solidly ingrained in our
culture and legal traditions. 33 Malice and depraved heart
have long histories in the criminal code because they signal
the worst crimes that necessarily involve intentionality

rational appreciation of the trial process, as set forth in Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402 (1960).
29. Tortorici was, in my estimation, one of the worst cases in New York
criminal procedure in the past twenty-five years. See Judge Smith's dissent for
a thoughtful analysis, People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d 757, cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
94 (1999) (Smith, J., dissenting) and A Crime of Insanity (PBS Frontline
Television Broadcast Oct. 17, 2002) for a riveting profile of this sad case.
30. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
31. 92 N.Y.2d at 767-68.
32. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
33. For a review of the conflict between psychological research and legal
norms, see NORMAN J. FINKEL & W. GERROD PARROTT, EMOTIONS AND
CULPABILITY: HOW THE LAW IS AT ODDS WITH PSYCHOLOGY, JURORS, AND ITSELF

(2006). Cf. Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility: A DiagnosticNote, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006) (discussing
the conceptual and empirical limits of psychological findings on culpability).
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imbued with wickedness. The sadistic Cameron Hooker, 34
who enslaved an innocent woman for his mere pleasure,
and the infamous cannibal, Jeffery Dahmer, 35 strike at the
heart of our fears about the worst of humanity. Yet this is
also where psychological science flourishes, as the
psychological construct of psychopathy has shown real
promise in elucidating the mental phenomena behind
behaviors most would call evil. 36 Nonetheless, the lure of
scientific explanations about evil should not displace
normative judgments since such explanations fail to fully
explain such a pervasive and intangible human condition.
Evil behavior is extensive and multifaceted, and
consequently, experts who claim people like Dahmer
suffered from a cancer of the mind are surely on shaky
ground. 37 The law rejects such claims because our culture
views it as entirely incompatible with its ontological
construction of free will and culpability. Our culture rejects
it because it knows the end result of such deductions means
that very few people, if any, would be responsible for their
behaviors. Evil behavior, albeit not on the order of
Dahmer's, arises from the many, not the few. In this sense,
cultural cognition is a powerful force indeed 38 and, perhaps,
represents a collective common sense.
Culture is also an important and determining
component in social institutions. The law is an extension of
our culture and studying cases helps us understand that
very fact. Whether it is the case of subliminal messages in
the Judas Priest case, 39 the botched psychological autopsy
of Mate Hartwig from the U.S.S. Iowa, 40 the utter tragedy
of Andrea Yates, 41 the death penalty sentence of the alleged

34. EWING & MCCANN, supra note 9, at 81.

35. Id. at 141.
36. See HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHY, supra note 8.
37. Dr. Fred Berlin claimed that Jeffery Dahmer suffered from a "love
sickness" and that his sexual proclivities and violence were indicative of a
"cancer of the mind." See Maureen O'Donnell, 4 Experts Call Dahmer Sane; 3
Disagree,CHI.-SUN TIMES, Feb. 14, 1992, at 10.

38. See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and
Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149 (2006).

39. EWING & MCCANN, supranote 9, at 103.
40. Id. at 129.
41. Id. at 229.
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mentally retarded Daryl Atkins, 42 or the controversial sex
change of Michael Kantaras, 43 law imitates life insofar as
these cases are notorious not just because behavioral
experts were injected into the mix, but because such cases
turned vexing cultural controversies into formal adversarial
forums with a decision only favorable to one side at the end.
Thus, these cases became, in essence, prominent political
spectacles with each side claiming that their position was
the only true one worth siding with in the end. It was not
just the finality of judgment that attracted public attention,
but the litigant's drawing upon the force of law to decree
such positions as true and correct that enticed us all. This is
the attraction of law; in the end someone is a winner with
the appearance of permanent imprimatur of our legal
institutions and government. Moreover, law is unique
because, unlike science or the humanities, it can back up its
decrees with force. 44 Thus, law indeed attracts controversy;
but power begets politics, and science and politics rarely
mix well. As the cases in Minds on Trial show, the interplay
of law and science is profoundly interesting and risky as
well.
B. A Change of Mind
A psychologist must like people to be effective at his job.
Unlike the radiologist who peers into the brain via an MRI
looking for lesions, the psychologist seeks an understanding
of the metaphysical mind behind the behavior. Such
investigations are invariably descriptive; behind each killer,
sex offender, and psychopath lies a story. It is these life
stories that keep many psychologists engaged in their work
despite the uncertain future of the discipline. 45 Even with

42. Id. at 217. It is worth noting that it is not entirely clear that Atkins is
mentally retarded. See Adam Liptak, Rising IQ Imperils Killer Once Considered
Mentally Retarded, S. F. CHRON., Feb. 6, 2005, at A9.
43. EWING & MCCANN, supra note 9, at 241.
44. See MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION (1918).

45. I may be in the minority here, but I see an uncertain future because
health insurance coverage for clinical psychology (the majority of psychological
work) is poor and stagnant, other disciplines are providing psychotherapy at a
cheaper rate, and the various psychological professional organizations seem
more vested in various extraneous political causes than on promoting the
livelihood of their members.
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all of the psychological tests, the new science of brain
imaging, and genetic analyses, the "meat" which sustains
us lies with intensely trying to understand what motivates
someone to kill another, confess to a crime she did not
commit, or join in the criminal enterprise of her kidnappers.
Whether it is the bizarre world of George Metesky, 46 the
intense anger of Prosenjit Poddar, 47 or the psychotic mind of
Ralph Tortorici, 48 the heart of the forensic practice is
gathering a robust appreciation of what events led up to
that point in time where a person crosses from mere citizen
to a focus of the law's energy. In this vein, forensic
psychology is the same as it was during its infancy; yet as
Minds on Trial demonstrates the field has grown
substantially over the years, mainly due to the extent of
issues mental health experts feel qualified to investigate.
This fact parallels perhaps the growth of our laws in
general, with a growing armatarium of criminal offenses
and maze of regulations borne by the belief that better
living can be engineered by legal institutions or institutions
ruled by law at their forefront.
While current scholarship is replete with studies about
faulty memories, false confessions, and problematic
eyewitness testimony, those important discoveries are
hardly new. Hugo Munsterberg, the father of applied
psychology, wrote about those very issues 49 before the
influential sociological jurisprudence of Pound. 50 What is
odd and tells us much about the human condition is how
enduring popular beliefs overvalue the accuracy of
memories and confessions despite longstanding scientific
evidence to the contrary. What is new is how authoritative
mental health professionals have become in a relatively

46. EWING & MCCANN, supra note 9, at 7.
47. Id. at 57.
48. Id. at 91.
49. See HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908).

50. Pound was prescient about the controversy that would envelop
applications of the social sciences to law when he said "there will be much
experimenting and some fumbling and much dissatisfaction." Roscoe Pound,
Criminal Justice in the American City-A Summary, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
CLEVELAND 559, 588 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922).
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short period of time. 51 As the cases in Minds on Trial show,
within the past fifty years or so, the courts have entertained
cases of subliminal messages within music, psychological
autopsies, mental retardation's impact on the death
penalty, parental alienation, and numerous "syndrome"
defenses. Each of these cases is covered in Minds on Trial
and one cannot but notice the expert at the forefront of
each.
Indeed, the courts and our society rely on experts. But
this reliance is less about arriving at consensus than on
assuring consensus never occurs. Modern media represents
this well as journalism has devolved into an inevitable
clash of experts who often fall along political partisan lines.
Each puts forth his claim, eagerly trashes his opponent's
conclusions, and rarely acknowledges that the truth may
contain variations of both sides. Instead of striving for
truth, our contemporary experts seem more invested in
winning-a legacy of the legal and political system. It is not
just how our experts conduct themselves but what they feel
free to comment upon that brings us to our current
condition. In our world, where moral condemnation remains
steadfast without the commitments of religion, a moral
authority remains necessary to justify the force of our
condemnation. Sigmund Freud's legacy has not been the id,
ego, and superego, but rather his enduring contribution (or
stain, depending on your view) is the popular acceptance of
mental health experts as the first source consulted for life's
problems. 52 Gone are the days of self-reliance and
conquering one's own demons. Instead, we have a culture
rife with mental disorders and studies purporting large

51. I discuss this in more detail elsewhere. See Steven K. Erickson, The
Myth of Mental Disorder: TranssubstantiveBehavior and Taxometric Psychiatry
(Yale Univ. Sch. of Med., Dep't of Psychiatry Working Paper Series, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=942122.
52. Fuller Torrey presents a striking indictment about Freud's permutations
in American culture. E. FULLER TORREY, FREUDIAN FRAUD: THE MALIGNANT
EFFECT OF FREUD'S THEORY ON AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CULTURE (1992). What
is often forgotten about Freudian thought was its reliance on its theoretical
formulations of humanity and mental illness. That is, Freudian thinking was
primarily a conceptual idea with little empirical support for its assumptions.
Thus, it was antithetical to the tenets of the scientific method while claiming to
be, at least somewhat, based on science. See generally Erickson, supra note 51.
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numbers of people "addicted"53 to sun tanning 54 or the
internet. 55 Others
are
supposedly
afflicted
with
Intermittent Explosive Disorder with millions of precious
federal research
dollars spent ascertaining its supposed
56
prevalence.
Even a cursory examination of the diverse cases
presented in Minds on Trial leaves one with the impression
that psychological constructs have become powerful forces
in our society and law. This is a relatively new phenomenon
and its effect is profound. In a short fifty years, we have
grown accustomed to claims of Battered Women's
58
Syndrome, 57 a plethora of diminished capacity defenses,
and the general claim of biological propensities overtaking
free will. 59 While many of these legal defenses may deserve
attention, they represent a fundamental shift in how we
construe questions of individual responsibility and moral
accountability. American criminal law has always
considered mens rea an important component of a just legal

53. For an overview of the problems associated with concept of addiction, see
Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (2006). Like Morse, I think lay people and experts alike
misunderstand the concept of addiction as applied to legal agents.
54. See Molly M. Warthan, Tatsuo Uchida & Richard F. Wagner, UV Light
Tanning as a Type of Substance-Related Disorder, 141 ARCHIVES DERMATOLOGY
963 (2005).
55. See Kimberly S. Young, Internet Addiction: The Emergence of a New
Clinical Disorder,1 CYBER PSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 237 (1996).
56. See Ronald Kessler et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of DSM-IV
Intermittent Explosive Disorderin the National Comorbidity Survey Replication,
63 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 669 (2006).

57. The seminal work in this area, of course, was done by co-author Ewing
himself. See CHARLES PATRICK EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1987).

58. California was the first state in the U.S. to adopt the diminished
capacity defense, beginning with People v. Wells, 202 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1949), and
People v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d 492 (Cal. 1959).
59. There has been much scholarship on this idea. See, e.g., Deborah W.
Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 269 (2002); Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal
Law: The True Impact of the Genetic Revolution, 52 DUKE L.J. 1031 (2003). But
see Stephen J. Morse, Inevitable Mens Rea, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 51, 62
(2003) (arguing that mens rea is required because only it can give meaning to
purposeful movements).
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system, 60 but the unperceivable line which divides excuse
from culpability has inched further away from the latter for
quite some time. 61 This movement is not so much due to
popular will, but by the influence of modern psychology.
What is interesting here is not so much that more crimes
are excused-in fact, I doubt that they are-but the types of
behaviors deemed worthy of psychological defenses has
steadily increased.
One may conclude that this is a good thing. Science is
exponential; our knowledge as psychological scientists
grows every day. Indeed, there have been many fascinating
discoveries in the scientific world about the brain and mind.
But, as mentioned in the beginning of this Book Review,
law and science are different creatures. Imagine the world
of facts in a scientific world entering a funnel. 62 The job of
science can be understood as taking in the outside world
and funneling down observations into theories which
become scientific laws. If a fact does not fit through the
funnel, then the law does not hold true for that fact. With
law, however, it is the inverse; laws are created and
distributed to the world. Thus, one obeys the criminal code
not because its dictates are shown to be true, but because
they are declared true. Perhaps this explains why
arguments about the failures of deterrence never gain much
popular traction; people believe that criminal laws should
deter because they believe in the propriety of the criminal
code as a deterrent unto itself.
When the roads of law and science meet, it can be
difficult to make sense of the interaction. But explanations
of the metaphysical mind are even more troublesome. Why

60. A good review of the development of mens rea in criminal law is
provided in NORMAN J. FINKEL, INSANITY ON TRIAL 1-20 (1988). Of note is the

role of ecclesiastical law in this development which built on Judeo-Christian
notions placing intentions (i.e., mental states) at the forefront of moral
culpability issues.
61. There are convincing arguments, however, that this trend has reversed
itself considerably within the last twenty-five years. See WHITMAN, supra note
5. Indeed, our current culture appears punitive-driven; nonetheless, our society
continues to accept an increasing array of material explanations for behavior in
lieu of moral accountability. The expanding plethora of "addictions" is a
testament to this fact.
62. This analogy was derived from William J. Stuntz's excellent article, The
Political Constitutionof CriminalJustice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 782-83 (2006).
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would a mother drown her five children? 63 The law turns to
behavioral experts for the answer. The expert examines the
defendant and may determine that, indeed, she has a
serious mental illness which impaired her thinking during
the commission of the crime. But the question the law
really is interested in is not why she killed, but should it
hold her accountable on par with non-mentally ill
defendants. Here the expert is on difficult ground because
this is not a scientific question; the expert must rely on
judgment and experience in answering questions of moral
capacity and the like. In so doing, the psychologist has
quietly assumed vestments placed upon him or her by a
society infatuated with Dr. Phil and increasingly
uncomfortable with displays of the cr6che. Given this nearly
impossible task, behavioral experts do their best and are
often assailed for their conclusions.
The dissatisfaction many hold towards the expert belies
the discontent. We desire much from our science--cures for
disease, knowledge about the universe, reasons for physical
phenomena-but in describing the human condition,
science will always fall short. The reductionism of the
scientific method cannot account for the pleasure one has at
seeing a sunset, becoming a parent, or accomplishing a goal.
But our society has placed its bets, and science has become
a cataphatism of truth. Popular doctrine thus holds that
science must be able to provide answers for addiction,
sexual deviance, and poor parenting if the discipline only
worked harder on those questions. The notion that the
"answer" to these questions is "out there" provides
tremendous temptation for experts who enjoy their
anointed posts in the legal system. When the proffered
behavioral explanations
are in conflict, politically
undesirable, or in some way unsatisfying, condemning the
experts becomes easy. Thus, a psychotic mother who kills
her five children and gives some indication that she knew
64
her actions were illegal, and perhaps morally wrong, is

63. Woman Not Guilty in Retrial in the Deaths of Her 5 Children, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A20.
64. See, e.g., Letter from Dr. Park Dietz, Clinical Professor of Psychiatry and
Biobehavioral Sci., UCLA Sch. of Med., to Joseph S. Owmby & Kaylynn
Williford, Harris County Assistant Dist. Attorneys (Feb. 25, 2002),
http://parkdietzassociates.com/files/Report-of-Dr.ParkDietz-re.AndreaYate
s 2002.pdf (claiming that Yates was sane at the time of the murders).
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easily condemned by our political criminal justice system6 5
and considered deserving of punishment. This is
of
claim
science's
of
irrespective
accomplished
schizophrenia's devastating and enduring impairment on
cognition,6 6 because casting suspicion on the expert who
proffers such an explanation creates an easy scapegoat to
difficult questions of disposition and satisfies our collective
anger towards the law-breaker.
II. INSANITY AND MORALITY
In reading Minds on Trial and this Book Review, it is
abundantly clear that behavioral science experts have
endured their share of criticism. A simple (and overly
simplistic, albeit popular) way of thinking about this fact
holds such experts willing to excuse any behavior simply
because such excuses give experts power within our legal
system. More cynically, one may say experts are willing to
sell their testimony and psychological defenses are
fundamentally a ruse. Seeing the world in such
dichotomous constructions is efficient but hardly accurate.
Psychological explanations of legally relevant conduct are
controversial because they seek reasons for the conduct
outside of normative structures. That is, while the law
wants to know if someone acted with a malicious heart, it
grows inpatient with any elucidation of what malice means
to the human condition. Moreover, while our legal system
suggests a desire to understand the crazy behavior of its
litigants, it is invested mostly with the ultimate issue of
guilt. Explanations seem to detract from the ultimate issue
not amenable
because they suggest a complicated world
67
with swift, severe, and certain punishment.
As a consequence, a discernable movement has been
afoot seeking to limit behavioral science explanations
65. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
66. See Terry E. Goldberg, Anthony S. David & James M. Gold,
Neurocognitive Deficits in Schizophrenia, in SCHIZOPHRENIA 168 (Steven R.
Hirsch & Daniel R. Weinberger eds., 2003).
67. The classical hypothesis of criminal deterrence suggests punishment
must have these elements. See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code:
Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365-580 (John

Bowring ed., 1962).
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within our legal system. Many point to the acquittal of John
Hinckley, Jr. as the impetus, 68 but the contentious
relationship between behavioral experts and the legal
system dates back further than the Hinckley case. 69 While
many cases within our legal system involve behavioral
science experts, none draw more fire from critics than
insanity claims. Insanity, like the modern American
criminal code itself, operates almost entirely on the moral
proposition of blameworthiness. Blackstone famously held
that where there was a defect of understanding there was
no choice because the offender had no will to guide her
conduct. 70 As the moral code that is our criminal law
progressed, gradations of culpability joined the canon under
the notions of fairness and justice. 71 Thus, diminished
capacity results in manslaughter because the facts and
circumstances surrounding the crime suggest less moral
condemnation than murder. Mens rea matters because it
directly speaks to intent and moral blame.
Despite this rich tradition in our criminal law, mens rea
and insanity seem under attack. Of course, these elements
of our criminal law have always drawn the ire of many
because they can never be known with certainty. From its
inception in criminal law, claims of experts excusing away
the guilty based on assessments of mens rea have routinely
been decried as undermining our criminal justice system. 72
In our modern era of DNA evidence, mens rea and insanity
evidence appears even less reliable as it lags behind the
other advances of science. Yet behavior is difficult; it is not
comprised of merely four molecules. 73 The history of mens
rea is one born out of a desire for a more just criminal
justice system, but attacked from its birth because
ascertaining the mental state of an offender requires faith

68. See HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE
EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM (1993).

AND AFTER

HINCKLEY:

69. See, e.g., Judson F. Falknor & David T. Steffen, Evidence of Character:
From the "Crucibleof the Community" to the "Couch of the Psychiatrist,"102 U.
PA. L. REV. 980 (1954).

70. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *20-33.
71. See FINKEL, supra note 60, at 5-7.

72. See FINKEL & PARROTT, supra note 33, at 18-20.
73. DNA is composed of only four amino acids. See JAMES D. WATSON &
ANDREW BERRY, DNA: THE SECRET OF LIFE (2003).
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that such states can be empirically known. Faith is a
requisite because the mind is elusive in our material world.
Scientists can measure mental phenomena as they manifest
themselves in the world; ascertaining moral culpability
moves the examination into the normative realm which is
in construct flux. This section explores the dynamic
relationship between criminal law and behavioral science
by examining the Supreme Court's recent insanity decision
and its focus on moral capacity as the measure of
culpability.
A. Clark and the Mental State
Last year, the United States Supreme Court decided
the case of Clark v. Arizona.74 Announced at the end of its
75
term, Clark was overshadowed by Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
decided on that same summer day. The issue before the
Court was set forth at the beginning of the opinion by
Justice Souter:
The case presents two questions: whether due process prohibits
Arizona's use of an insanity test stated solely in terms of the
capacity to tell whether an act charged as a crime was right or
wrong; and whether Arizona violates due process in restricting
consideration of defense evidence of mental illness and incapacity
to its bearing on a claim of insanity, thus eliminating its
significance directly on the issue of the mental element of the
crime charged (known in legal shorthand as the mens rea, or guilty
mind). We hold that there is no violation of due process in either
76
instance.

The facts of the crime were mostly undisputed. Clark
was charged with the murder of a police officer, there was
no question that Clark did shoot the officer, and there was
circumstantial evidence that Clark knew the victim was a
police officer at the time of the shooting. The tragedy
unfolded as such:
In the early morning hours, a Flagstaff police officer responded
in uniform to complaints that a pickup truck with loud music

74. 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006).
75. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
76. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2716.
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blaring was circling a residential block. When he located the truck,
the officer turned on the emergency lights and siren of his marked
patrol car, which prompted petitioner Eric Clark, the truck's
driver (then 17), to pull over. Officer Moritz got out of the patrol
car and told Clark to stay where he was. Less than a minute later,
Clark shot the officer, who died shortly after but not before calling
the police dispatcher for help. Clark fled on foot but was arrested
that
later that day with gunpowder residue on his hands; the gun
77
killed the officer was found nearby, stuffed into a knit cap.

There was little doubt that Clark was mentally ill. The
evidence underscored the severity of his schizophrenia:
As to his insanity, then, Clark presented testimony from
classmates, school officials, and his family describing his
increasingly bizarre behavior over the year before the shooting.
Witnesses testified, for example, that paranoid delusions led Clark
to rig a fishing line with beads and wind chimes at home to alert
him to intrusion by invaders, and to keep a bird in his automobile
to warn of airborne poison. There was lay and expert testimony
that Clark thought Flagstaff was populated with "aliens" (some
trying to kill
impersonating government agents), the "aliens" were
78
him, and bullets were the only way to stop them.

Clark pled insanity under Arizona's Guilty But Insane
statute. As expected, there was disagreement among the
mental health experts as to whether Clark was legally
insane at the time of the killing. Arizona's formulation was
barebones: "A person may be found guilty except insane if
at the time of the commission of the criminal act the person
was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such
severity that the person did not know the criminal act was
79
wrong."
At trial, the court ruled that Clark could not rely on his
evidence of insanity to dispute his mens rea under the
recent case of State v. Mott,80 which had affirmed Arizona's
statute forbidding psychiatric evidence to negate specific
intent. Clark was convicted during a bench trial at which
the court concluded that despite Clark's severe mental

77. Id.
78. Id. at 2717.
79. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

13-502(A) (2001).

80. 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997).
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illness, it "did not . . . distort his perception of reality so
1
severely that he did not know his actions were wrong."'
Clark appealed his conviction and after being affirmed by
the Arizona Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
Arizona's insanity statute was noteworthy for one
particular reason. Prior to 1993, the statute was typical of
many jurisdictions which had simply codified the
M'Naghten rule.8 2 In 1993, Arizona dispensed with the
cognition prong, leaving what the Court described as the
"moral capacity" test as the sole issue. Thus, in Arizona a
person could only be found insane if he can prove that
during the commission of the crime in question he was so
mentally ill that he could not tell right from wrong.8 3 The
court's opinion left no doubt about its skepticism of mental
health experts:
Evidence of mental disease, then, can easily mislead; it is very
easy to slide from evidence that an individual with a professionally
recognized mental disease is very different, into doubting that he
has the capacity to form mens rea, whereas that doubt may not be
justified. And ... in . . . cases . . . in which the categorization is
doubtful or the category of mental disease is itself subject to
controversy, the risks are even greater that opinions about mental
disease may confuse a jury into thinking the opinions show more
than they do. Because allowing mental-disease evidence on mens
rea can thus easily mislead, it is not unreasonable to address that
tendency by confining consideration of this kind of evidence to
insanity, on84 which a defendant may be assigned the burden of
persuasion.

At the same time, the Court held that Arizona's Mott
rule did not violate due process despite reading Mott as "to
confine to the insanity defense any consideration 8'of5
characteristic behavior associated with mental disease.
In sum, Clark was allowed only to provide mental health

81. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2718.
82. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW:

THEORY AND PROCESS 1038-40 (Joseph Goldstein, Alan M. Dershowitz & Richard
D. Schwartz eds., 1974).
83. See 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 256, §§ 2-3.
84. Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2735.
85. Id. at 2627.
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expert testimony as to whether he had moral capacity
during the alleged crime; any further expert testimony
regarding his mental illness was disallowed.
As one noted scholar has pointed out, Clark raised two
potentially significant issues on appeal: whether there was
a constitutionally mandated minimum definition of
criminal sanity and whether the Constitution mandated
86
allowance of exculpatory evidence (in terms of mens rea).
To the first, the Court held that the numerous state
variations argued against a minimum formulation and that
Arizona's elimination of the cognitive prong did not offend
principles of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience to be ranked as fundamental. Without clarifying
whether insanity claims themselves occupy a fundamental
rung of the constitutional ladder, the court went through a
torturous analysis suggesting that, in fact, the cognitive
prong of M'Naghten had merely been subsumed under the
moral prong of Arizona's amended statute. Thus, mistakes
of law and fact by the mentally ill offender had simply been
merged, as one commentator has suggested.8 7 Such
suggestions, of course, ignore the reasons for the
amendment itself. The reality was that Arizona amended
its insanity statute for the same reasons most states and
Congress had done within the past twenty years. The
perception that insanity claims are frequently based upon
junk science88 that often lead to unjust results was the
motivating force. Of course, such amendments have not
prevented behavioral experts from opining on insanity
claims. When it comes to defendants who appear crazy, the
legal system does what the popular media and everyday
Americans do: they ask the behavioral expert for
explanations and their opinions.
What is curious about the transformed M'Naghten
standard is its shift towards what the Supreme Court
termed the "moral capacity" question.8 9 Since moral
capacity is not a construct of science, but rather, a
86. See Peter Weston, The Supreme Court's Bout with Insanity: Clark v.
Arizona, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143, 145 (2006).
87. Id. at 152-56.
88. Cf. Ronald J. Allen, Clark v. Arizona: Much (Confused) Ado About
Nothing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 135 (2006).
89. Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2719.
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convention of law, the newly designed M'Naghten standard
has less to do with psychology and much more to do with
normative judgments. Questions about whether someone
was so afflicted with mental illness as to not know whether
their actions were wrong can be thought of two ways. Either
the defendant knew the conduct per se was illegal, and
hence, wrong; or despite such illnesses a defendant should
know that such behavior is wrong. The former leads to easy
conclusions of guilt since even most disturbed minds have a
rudimentary understanding that killing is wrong. The
latter, of course, is not a question but an imperative and is
reflective of the prevailing skepticism of affirmative
defenses. Either way, the amended statute looks less
concerned with the affects of mental illness upon culpability
than with securing convictions by removing psychological
context from the equation. If there were any doubts about
Clark's removal of such contours of psychological
explanation, they were put to rest in the Court's discussion
of the Mott rule and its exclusion of mitigating mens rea
evidence.
The Mott rule was clear in its aim: the exclusion of
behavioral expert testimony short of insanity is a complete
bar. In Clark, the Supreme Court held that Mott did not
present an issue under Chambers v. Mississippi,90
regarding presentation of defense evidence. In so doing, the
Court signaled its agreement with Arizona, essentially
redefining intent to include psychotic-driven intention
similar to alcohol-induced automatism under Montana v.
Egelhoff.91 States are generally free to construct their
criminal codes as they see fit, yet Clark and Egelhoff are far
from similar in most respects. In Egelhoff, the Court upheld
Montana's exclusion of voluntary intoxication as an aspect
for consideration in determining the existence of a mental
state which is an element of a criminal offense. 92 The
defendant in that case, James Allen Egelhoff, shot two men
in the head while intoxicated and riding as a passenger in
the backseat of one of the victim's automobiles. Such
prohibitions seem convincing because even the most
addicted alcoholic freely chooses to begin down the path of

90. 410 U. S. 284 (1973).
91. 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
92. Id. at 49-51.
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alcoholism and, moreover, there is little scientific evidence
that alcohol intoxication can produce automatic behaviors.
Yet extending the principles of Egelhoff to the facts of Clark
is a stretch. No one chooses to be afflicted with
schizophrenia and it is well known in science that the
psychosis of schizophrenia9 can
profoundly impair sensation,
3
perception, and judgment.
What Mott really accomplished in Clark, however, was
not to exclude an expert from claiming that Eric Clark's
schizophrenia prevented him from understanding right
from wrong. Instead, Mott fundamentally altered the
manner in which an expert could explain his behavior. As
the Court in Clark duly noted in rebutting Justice
Kennedy's dissent, Clark was prohibited from presenting
evidence that explained how schizophrenia impaired people
in general. 94 Clark was free to present behavioral expert
testimony about Clark himself, but drawing any
abstractions between Clark's behavior and those typically
seen in schizophrenia could be excluded. This exclusion is a
powerful one for a number of reasons. First, since there
remains no laboratory test that can definitively prove the
existence of schizophrenia, the diagnosis is made chiefly by
comparing the behaviors of the patient in question with
categories of behaviors indicative of the disease. By
disallowing any comparison, the gateway suggesting the
expert is fabricating the diagnosis is more easily opened.
Since scientists cannot say chemical X was present in
Clark's blood and such chemical is known to lead to
behavior Y, the expert must rely on framing the reported
behavior with behavioral traits known as indicative of
mental illness. Lots of people believe strange things, but
when the belief comprises hidden microphones imbedded
within the body, plots by government officials to kill the
afflicted person, and hallucinations so persistent as to lead
someone to abandon most of their daily activities, the
description is one of mental illness. Second, the prohibition
removes any meaningful discussion linking the disease and
the behavior in question. The behaviors of Clark were not
random; they were, in fact, typical of florid psychosis and
extreme paranoia. The expert's power in explaining the

93. See Goldberg et al., supra note 66.
94. See Clark, 126 S.Ct. at 2732-37.
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behaviors of someone like Clark comes from his or her
ability to take bizarre, seemingly random behavior and
make sense of it by noting its similarity to that of others
afflicted with psychosis. Psychosis has a structure within
its madness: hallucinations are impairments of sensory
processing, delusions signal illogical thought, and
inattentiveness is an outward manifestation of a damaged
cognition. 95 Third, the Mott rule and its discussion in Clark
demonstrate how differently we treat mental illnesses from
physical ones. One is hard-pressed to imagine these
exclusions used with cancer, diabetes, or other ailments. Of
course, those illnesses would hardly be used in a criminal
affirmative defense and behavioral illnesses are different
from physical ones in many respects. Moreover, criminal
law is chiefly concerned with behavior and it should be no
surprise that mental illnesses are given careful scrutiny.
But the Court's rhetoric in discussing Mott, its willingness
to permit Arizona to limit discussion of mental illness
outside of saying that Clark had one, along with its
cynicism towards psychological concepts represents a
surgical removal of psychological science from the sanity
issue. Thus, the much discussed "moral capacity" of Clark is
a concurrence towards popular conceptions of insanity as
rampant with abuse while leaving the expert firmly
entrenched. To put it differently, Clark moves insanity
further away from the grasp of a defendant's hands in our
retributive times while preserving the appearance that
such defendants can proffer scientific experts. Clark
undermines science while bantering its shortcomings.
B. Being Mindful in the Wake of Clark
The cases presented in Minds on Trial all have one
thing in common: each was intensely followed during its
time and many people detested the behavioral experts
employed in those cases. It is easy to assail such experts
because, unlike oncologists or astrophysicists, everyone has
a mind and most people think they are experts in
understanding it. The idea that someone would confess to a
crime he did not commit or that eyewitness testimony is
often unreliable smacks of incredulity. Such propositions
95. See BENJAMIN J. SADOCK & VIRGINIA A. SADOCK, SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY:
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES/CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 280-87, 471-504 (2003).
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seem so at odds with our experiences and social
the
constructions of reality. When scientists claim that
96
theory of quantum physics may be wrong after all, most
people just assume such claims are on account of our better
understanding of the universe. When those claims are
about recovered memories of abuse or the link between
sexual abuse and psychological adjustment, the world of
science has entered hallowed ground and often takes a
lashing. 97 Such outcomes have much ado with law, our
culture, and science itself.
Cases like the well-known Ferguson trial 98 and the
current Panetti99 case before the Court often leave the lay
public with feelings of anger and bewilderment; anger
because defendants charged with horrendous crimes claim
after conviction that their mental state prevented a fair
trial and bewilderment because the courts entertain such
claims. In Panetti,the defendant shot and killed his in-laws
in front of his estranged wife and young child. Scott Panetti
had a long history of severe mental illness, but nonetheless
was deemed competent to stand trial and represent himself.
During the course of the trial, Panetti tried to subpoena
Jesus Christ, Pope John Paul, and former President John F.
Kennedy. Panetti was convicted and sentenced to death.
The issue on appeal is whether Panetti can be put to death
under the Supreme Court's Wainwright'00 precedent.
Although Panetti has a factual understanding of the death
sentence, his understanding is mired in his psychotic
delusions. From a legal perspective, competency is an
ambiguous doctrine; as a scientific matter, Panetti is clearly
crazy. The outcome of Panetti will likely please some and
anger others.
Likewise, cases like Clark have aftermaths as well.
Experts are derided for their junk science, but cases like

96. See, e.g., PETER WOIT, NOT EVEN WRONG: THE FAILURE OF STRING THEORY
AND THE SEARCH FOR UNITY IN PHYSICAL LAw (2006).

97. See, e.g., Scott 0. Lilienfeld, When Worlds Collide: Social Science,
Politics, and the Rind et al. (1998): Child Sexual Abuse Meta-Analysis, 57 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 176 (2002).
98. People v. Ferguson, 248 A.D.2d 725 (N.Y. 1998).
99. Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. granted Panetti v.
Quarterman, 127 S.Ct. 852 (2007).
100. Wainwright v. Ford, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984).
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Clark and laws like Arizona's new insanity statute pull
experts away from their science. In an effort to sharpen (or
limit) the focus of sanity questions, courts and legislatures
have sought to move the question from the expert's hand to
one of common parlance. Moral capacity
seems
straightforward, but behavioral experts are not experts on
moral questions. Their expertise lies in identifying and
explaining how mental illnesses such as schizophrenia
affect the lives of people like Eric Clark. These explanations
should include the abundance of solid, scientific evidence
demonstrating how schizophrenia impairs cognition.
Understanding this fact helps us make sense of how
someone like Clark could know murder to be illegal in the
abstract sense but not grasp or appreciate how his psychotic
actions were wrong when he shot Officer Moritz. Yet the
law seems to desire a return to the old days of pre-biological
behavioral science when psychiatrists and psychologists
proffered opinions based solely upon unproven theoretical
paradigms of personality and psychosexual development.
Such opinions may or may not be easier to discount, but
they surely do not serve the interests of justice.
Yet law is not alone in this indictment. There is much
to be displeased about with psychological and psychiatric
science. The number of diagnosable mental disorders has
ballooned from about one hundred disorders in 1952 to
almost
three
hundred
today. 0
From
"caffeine
paraphilias, 103
sexual
intoxication"'10 2 to numerous
professional mental health treads on thin ice when it claims
its science is unblemished by political or other motives. If
Clark encourages behavioral experts to testify about moral
questions, the profession is surely to oblige since our
culture happily welcomes psychological explanations to
moral questions. These explanations invariably weaken
personal choice and increasingly
value biological
determinism but leave us unsatisfied-just as popular
accounts of insanity do-because they can never provide
robust answers to moral questions. The human condition is

101. See Erickson, supra note 51.
102. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS: TEXT REVISION 232-34 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-

TRI.
103. See id. at 566-76.
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a synthesis of psychological, moral, and cultural conditions
(at the least) and we should resist the draw to invoke one to
explain the other when gratifying explanations are not
forthcoming. Yet, our culture increasingly desires the
opposite.
Culture is a peculiar thing; we feel powerless against it
and yet most desire to shape it. Our popular culture is
infected with misguided notions of mental illness and
mental health, and it is to our detriment. Whether it is the
10 5
belief in futile concept of self-esteem, 104 addiction to food, 106
or conviction that immoral conduct signifies a sick brain,
we have become complacent with accepting expert
judgments in place of common sense. Irrespective of what
an institution or individual donned with the robes of
expertise or authority tell us, we are not bound by our
genes nor predestined by our biological drives. Culture is
powerful and ours is progressively one which seeks answers
narrowly through the prism of science. As science fills the
void of authority, bad outcomes are inevitable. Accordingly,
we get cases like Foucha v. Louisiana10 7 and United States
v. Jackson 0 8 that both cite the psychiatric concept of
Antisocial Personality Disorder' 0 9 as the chief reason for
involuntary commitment and the reason why involuntary
commitment based upon it is unconstitutional. The draw of
moral authority is powerful and corrupts our science. It
becomes worse when we separate scientific experts from

104. See Roy F. Baumeister et al., Does High Self-Esteem Cause Better
Performance, Interpersonal Success, Happiness, or Healthier Lifestyles?, 4
PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1 (2003).
105. For an overview of the problems associated with concept of addiction,
see Morse, supra note 53.
106. A common example of this thinking is with pedophilia. See Richard
Green, Is Pedophilia a Mental Disorder?, 31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAv. 467
(2002).
107. 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (holding that further commitment was
unconstitutional because such commitment was sought for Foucha's antisocial
personality).
108. 19 F.3d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding the district court's
finding of dangerousness, "because the evidence shows that his current
dangerousness stems from an antisocial personality rather than schizophrenia
and that he can be held legally only if his violent behavior is 'due to a present
mental disease or defect"').
109. See DSM-IV-TR, supranote 102, at 701-06.
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science, as Clark does, because all that remains is arbitrary
judgment thinly veiled under the guise of objectivity.
The mind in our modern culture has become the moral
force. We have eagerly accepted the notion of bad behavior
as almost exclusively a byproduct of an abnormal mind or
even the dysfunctional brain. Many scoff at the idea of any
moral authority whatsoever and yet reel when behavioral
experts proffer opinions exculpating bad behavior. Indeed,
it seems we want blame and an amoral society
simultaneously; culpability without absolute judgments
about what behaviors are right or wrong. And, of course, we
cannot have such a system unless we are willing to have
one endemic with abuse and built on a precarious social
structure. Behavior is more than the mind put into action.
Psychological science is a good thing; it helps us understand
the mind. Experts are necessary and good as well; they help
explain complex mental phenomena. But ultimately, it is us
who decide where to draw the lines between normative and
empirical matters. We should resist the temptation to erase
that line because our arrogance leads us to believe science
can provide a value-free world. The law cannot help itself; it
will give us more Panetti,Ferguson,and Jackson cases if we
allow it.
CONCLUSION

Minds on Trial is a first-rate book. It should be
celebrated for its gripping stories and thoughtful analysis of
cases that tried the patience and soul of the American legal
system. In a legal system geared towards reaching
outcomes and a culture obsessed with efficiency, Minds on
Trial reminds us that behind the headlines are stories of
people deserving to be told. Whether that story is the
insane Yates or wicked Dahmer, truth really is more
interesting than fiction. Psychological science can tell us
much about why people behave and those explanations can
and should impact our laws and policy.
The impact, however, must get the order right. Science
informs us; it should never dictate. It may well be true that
competency abilities of juveniles are less sophisticated than
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adults, 110 but deciding what to do with that information is
not the purview of science. Science cannot prove law right
or wrong. What should determine these final questions is
the empire of law-and in the final analysis, our moral
judgments. Nonetheless, law should not ignore the findings
of science. While the old adage says that change brings
more of the same, our understanding of behavior is not
stagnant and neither should constitutional criminal justice.
Debating how our legal system should evolve with scientific
findings is a necessary discussion we should have-but the
first point is that it should evolve in the first place. As
science is surely to advance proofs about our human
condition, law cannot ignore the inherent moral claims of
such evidence.
But as law and science must respect each other, the
ultimate burden falls on us. We like material explanations
for mental phenomenon because they seem to provide
answers to difficult questions every person is intimately
associated with. There are few people who have not
pondered about the inexorable truth of the mind. Our
individual experiences are uniquely our own, yet we have a
primitive bond with our fellow men and women because we
know, they too, have minds. Bridging the individual and
collective experience is difficult, especially when some
people engage in appalling or crazy behavior. Material
answers that invoke determinism or parochial ones which
provide simple condemnation are appealing but fall short of
our individual and collective responsibility to construct a
just legal system. That responsibility is a heavy burden for
each of us to endure, but good outcomes in this world are
built upon hard work.
We can begin this work by
thoughtfully reading good books like Minds on Trial, while
remembering that the rights guaranteed in our criminal
justice system come with responsibilities. 1 ' Ensuring a just
criminal justice system is surely
one of those
responsibilities. Such a system needs our careful attention
to the mind behind the indispensable moral agent.

110. See Thomas Grisso et al., Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents' and Adults' Capacitiesas Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
333 (2004).
111. For a historical analysis of the link between legal rights and
responsibilities, see William J. Stuntz, When Rights Are Wrong, 62 FIRST
THINGS 14 (1996), http://www.firstthings.com/article.php3?id-article=3854.

